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An Umbrella in a Hurricane: 
Cyber Technology and the December 2013 
Amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement 
By Innokenty Pyetranker* 
Scenes of near-apocalyptic devastation resulting from good software gone bad are no 
longer the stuff of science fiction flicks starring bodybuilders-cum-governors. Lightning-
fast technological progress and the ubiquity of the Internet have made it easy for our 
imaginations, as well as our political leaders, to conjure up realistic images of cyber 
nightmares come true. Now that fears about what lurks inside cyberspace have gone 
mainstream, I examine one action ostensibly aimed to allay such fears: the December 2013 
amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (commonly known as the Wassenaar Arrangement). 
My analysis of the December 2013 amendment—which was passed to prevent certain dual-
use cyber technologies from falling into the wrong hands—proceeds in three parts. First, 
I argue that history teaches that cyber products are not generally amendable to export 
controls. Second, I find that the Wassenaar Arrangement’s institutional flaws are so 
enfeebling that the Arrangement’s very utility is questionable. Third, I assert that economic 
incentives, globalization, and the intangibility of cyber technology all present formidable 
obstacles to the December 2013 amendment’s success. Although the December 2013 
amendment is likely doomed to irrelevance, I conclude that concerted action—rather than 
passive pessimism—must be our response to cyber threats. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The New (Cyber) Normal 
It doesn’t take much to imagine the consequences of a successful cyber attack. In 
a future conflict, an adversary unable to match our military supremacy on the 
battlefield might seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities here at home. Taking 
down vital banking systems could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of clean water 
or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency. And as we’ve seen 
in past blackouts, the loss of electricity can bring businesses, cities and entire 
regions to a standstill.1 
¶1  That people now reside in something of a cyber world is a truism; it is a given that a 
multitude of our experiences from the cradle to the grave—from instagrammed sonogram 
shots2 to online education modules3 to corporate web conferencing4 to mobile dating apps5 
to virtual memorials for lost loved ones6—have gone or will eventually go cyber to some 
 
1 Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012, 7:15 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650.  
2 See, e.g., Esther Lee, Snooki Shares Sonogram Picture of Baby Girl: Pregnant Star Says Daughter 
“Already Applying Lipstick” in Womb, US WEEKLY (May 19, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-moms/news/snooki-sonogram-picture-pregnant-stars-baby-girl-
applying-lipstick-2014195.  
3 See, e.g., Sarah Mishkin, Saudi Arabia to use edX web courses to train unemployed, FIN. TIMES (July 
14, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67fe0cb8-0c3d-11e4-943b-00144feabdc0.html; Chris 
Parr, Mooc makeover saves refugee course, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/mooc-makeover-saves-refugee-course/2014493.article. 
4 See, e.g., June Bower, 4 Ways Video Conferencing Can Benefit Small Businesses, MASHABLE (June 2, 
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/06/02/online-meetings-small-biz/; Yardena Arar, Web conferencing 
showdown: What’s the best software for online meetings?, PCWORLD (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2010325/web-conferencing-showdown-whats-the-best-software-for-
online-meetings.html. 
5 See, e.g., Devjyot Ghoshal, Mobile dating apps suggest that the World Cup is a potent aphrodisiac, 
QUARTZ (June 25, 2014), http://qz.com/225744/the-world-cup-is-a-potent-aphrodisiac-for-mobile-dating-
apps/; Julie Spira, Mobile Love: 10 Dating Apps to Ramp Up Your Love Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 
2013, 2:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-spira/mobile-love-mobile-dating_b_4318293.html.  
6 See, e.g., Maya Socolovsky, Cyber-Spaces of Grief: Online Memorials and the Columbine High 
School Shootings, 24 JAC: A JOURNAL OF RHETORIC, CULTURE & POLITICS 467 (2004); Kenneth 
Emmerling, Online memorials and cyber immortality, EXAMINER (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/online-memorials-and-cyber-immortality; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Online 
Memorial Services: After a Death, Celebrating a Life Online, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303553204579348752262042642.  
Vol. 13:2] Innokenty Pyetranker 
 155 
extent.7 The Internet is so embedded in and indispensable to our day-to-day lives that 
access to it is described in the language of human rights.8 All the benefits of living in a 
networked society are, however, tempered by concomitant risks. In addition to the familiar 
perils of warfare, crime, espionage, and terrorism, new threats of cyberwarfare, 9 
cybercrime,10 cyberespionage,11 and cyberterrorism12 have emerged. In this brave new 
cyber-world, these dangers and others are poised to exploit our reliance on e-lifestyles.  
¶2  Cyberspace is already an established arena for confrontations. Virtual attacks 
regularly harm or even cripple individual businesses.13 Cybercriminals threaten entire 
sectors of the global economy.14 In late 2014, a single act of “cyber-vandalism” caused a 
 
7 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A HYPERCONNECTED WORLD 5 (2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RiskResponsibility_HyperconnectedWorld_Report_2014.pdf 
[hereinafter WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM] (“Digital technology touches virtually every aspect of daily life 
today. Social interaction, healthcare activity, political engagement or economic decision-making – digital 
connectivity permeates it all, and the dependence on this connectivity is growing swiftly.”). 
8 See Nathan Olivarez-Giles, United Nations report: Internet access is a human right, L.A. TIMES (June 
3, 2011, 6:42 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/06/united-nations-report-internet-
access-is-a-human-right.html. 
9 See, e.g., TED Talks, Chris Domas: The 1s and 0s behind cyber warfare, YOUTUBE (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWpRxyqDgpM; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. cyberwarfare force to grow 
significantly, defense secretary says, WASH. POST, (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyberwarfare-force-to-grow-significantly-
defense-secretary-says/2014/03/28/0a1fa074-b680-11e3-b84e-897d3d12b816_story.html; Spencer 
Kimball, NATO moves to apply armed conflict law to cyber warfare, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 2, 2014), 
http://dw.de/p/1CUid.  
10 See generally CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT (Jack M. Balkin, James 
Grimmelmann, Eddan Katz, Nimrod Kozlovski, Shlomit Wagman & Tal Zarsky eds., 2007); Nimrod 
Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing - Designing Accountable Policing (June 2005) (J.S.D. 
dissertation, Yale Law School) (available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/Kozlovski.pdf) 
(describing the nature of cybercrime).  
11 See, e.g., Lizzie Dearden, Germany ‘may use manual typewriters’ to fight cyber espionage, 
INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/germany-may-
use-manual-typewriters-to-fight-cyber-espionage-9607697.html; Juhana Rossi, Finland Victim of Long-
Term Cyberespionage, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/finland-victim-of-long-
term-cyberespionage-1404309676.  
12 See generally Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready?, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2010); 
Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (May 
13, 2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf. 
13 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 7, at 2-3 (“Risks of cyberattacks are starting to have a 
business impact. Controls put in place to protect information assets have at least a “moderate” impact on 
front-line employee productivity for nearly 90% of institutions [that were surveyed]. Moreover, security 
concerns are already making companies delay implementation of cloud and mobile technology capabilities. 
And while direct cyber resilience spend represents only a small share of total enterprise technology 
expenditure, some chief information officers (CIOs) and chief information security officers (CISOs) 
estimate that indirect or unaccounted security requirements drive as much as 20-30% of overall technology 
spending, crowding other projects that could create business value.“). See also Jonathan Zittrain, 
Intensifying Cyber Threats, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-zittrain/intensifying-cyber-threats_b_4645548.html (“[T]he 
Syrian Electronic Army, which supports Bashar al-Assad’s regime, has successfully managed to 
temporarily cripple the online operations of companies like Twitter and The New York Times.”). 
14 See, e.g., Craig Newman & Daniel Stein, Talking heads: why regulators are looking at cyber security, 
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53125dc0-00ec-11e3-8918-00144feab7de.html 
(“[T]he International Organization of Securities Commissions reports that 53 per cent of the world’s 
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national scandal and diplomatic kerfuffle.15 Indeed, cyber controversies play a 
consequential role in some bilateral relationships; between the United States and China, 
for instance, allegations and counter allegations of cyber espionage consistently threaten 
to mar ties between the two countries.16 Some have convincingly argued that an actual war 
conducted on a cyber battlefield “is still more hype than hazard,”17 but signs of the future 
are already visible. For instance, the use of cyber assaults by Russian forces against 
Georgia in 2008, illuminated—in the words of Professor John Arquilla—“the potential of 
cyberwar in a manner not unlike the way the Spanish Civil War foreshadowed the rising 
dominance of air power 75 years ago, offering a preview of World War II’s deadly aerial 
bombings.”18 More bluntly, Professor Ty Cobb predicts that cyberspace will be the setting 
in which 21st century conflicts will be fought.19 
¶3  Cyberspace is also an established arena for regulation. Many sovereign states address 
cyber issues in domestic legislation.20 Politicians from a number of countries—including 
 
securities exchanges were hit last year by cyber attacks, and that nearly every exchange recognises cyber 
crime as a significant, systematic risk…The annual worldwide cost of cyber crime has been estimated at 
$100bn, and studies have shown that financial services companies are among the most frequently 
affected.”). 
15 See, e.g., Brent Lang, Obama Calls Sony Hack ‘Cyber Vandalism,’ Not Act of War, VARIETY, (Dec. 
21, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://variety.com/2014/film/news/obama-calls-sony-hack-cyber-vandalism-not-act-
of-war-1201384777/ (“President Barack Obama told CNN that North Korea’s hack attack on Sony Pictures 
Entertainment is an act of ‘cyber-vandalism,’ not an act of war.”); Patrick Frater, Sony Hacking Spells 
Diplomatic Farce as China Weighs in With Equivocal Position, VARIETY (Dec. 21, 2014, 4:20 AM PT), 
http://variety.com/2014/film/news/sony-hacking-spells-diplomatic-farce-as-china-weighs-in-with-
equivocal-position-1201384689/ (“The chorus of accusations over the hacking of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment this weekend developed into a bout of diplomatic baiting and back-biting.”). 
16 See, e.g., William Wan & Ellen Nakashima, Report ties cyberattacks on U.S. computers to Chinese 
military, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-ties-100-plus-cyber-
attacks-on-us-computers-to-chinese-military/2013/02/19/2700228e-7a6a-11e2-9a75-
dab0201670da_story.html (reporting that senior U.S. officials, including President Obama, have repeatedly 
raised the issue of Chinese cyber attacks on commercial targets with Chinese government officials); Eyder 
Peralta, U.S. Files Criminal Charges Against Chinese Officials Over Cyberspying, NPR (May 19, 2014, 
9:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/05/19/313935588/reports-u-s-files-criminal-
charges-against-chinese-officials-over-cyber-spying (describing the U.S. government’s 2014 decision to 
file criminal charges against five Chinese military-affiliated hackers for stealing commercial secrets from 
American companies); Jonathan Kaiman, China reacts furiously to US cyber-espionage charges, 
GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/20/china-reacts-
furiously-us-cyber-espionage-charges (“China’s foreign ministry called the allegations preposterous and 
accused the US of double standards. The assistant foreign minister, Zheng Zeguang, summoned the US 
ambassador, Max Baucus, to lodge a formal complaint…China also accused the US of hypocrisy, tacitly 
recalling Edward Snowden’s revelations last year that Washington had overseen the hacking of Chinese 
companies, including the Shenzhen-based telecommunications company Huawei.”). 
17 Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar. 
18 John Arquilla, Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us. 
19 Ty Cobb, Cyber Warfare: Where the 21st Century Conflicts Will be Fought, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
(Mar. 5, 2012, 10:36 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2012/03/cyber-warfare-where-the-21st-century-conflicts-
will-be-fought/.  
20 See, e.g., ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO 
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 52-61 (2013), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf (listing U.S. laws with provisions related to cybersecurity); 
Pavan Duggal, Indian Cyber Law Developments 2013, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013, 1:46 PM), 
Vol. 13:2] Innokenty Pyetranker 
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the United States—have been especially adamant about improving cyber security in the 
private sector.21 Multilateral efforts to tackle cybercrime,22 cyber crises,23 and the export 
of cyber technology24 illustrate the seriousness with which world leaders treat cyberspace. 
B. Article Outline 
¶4  Cyber menaces looming on the horizon pose grave risks for individuals, businesses, 
and sovereign members of the international community alike. Recognizing the 
multifaceted nature of cyber threats, this Article takes a single, discrete danger—the 
proliferation of certain potentially destabilizing cyber products—and analyzes a single, 
discrete action that the international community has collectively taken to address that 
danger. Thus, this Article concentrates on the Wassenaar Arrangement—a global export 
control regime that has been labeled “the only important multilateral arrangement that 
addresses the conventional arms trade and high-technology items with military 
applications”25—and a recent Wassenaar Arrangement amendment intended to regulate the 
trade of certain dual-use cyber technologies (i.e., technologies that have both civilian and 
military uses). Part II provides background information on the global system for regulating 
 
http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/Cyberlawsintodaystimes/entry/indian-cyber-law-developments-
2013 (describing recent developments in Indian cyberlaw); Michael Knigge, German jitters over cyber 
attacks, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.dw.de/german-jitters-over-cyber-attacks/a-16658040 
(“This week Germany’s Interior Ministry released a first draft of a new law aimed at ‘raising the security of 
IT systems.’”); Brazil aims to bring order to lawless cyberspace, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2013, 3:35 PM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/brazil-cyberfraud-idUKL1N0BP52J20130226 (“Long seen as the 
Wild West of online fraud, Brazil is about to implement its first cyber-crimes law in an attempt to protect 
its rapidly expanding banking and e-commerce industries.”). 
21 See, e.g., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Special Assistant to the President and White House 
Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel – 007 or DDoS: What is Real World Cyber?, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-02-28_final_rsa_speech.pdf 
(“One governmental role is clear and uncontroversial: the government should help you – private sector 
companies – help yourself, particularly in the area of prevention.”); South Africa launches National Cyber 
Security Advisory Council, IT NEWS AFRICA (Oct. 15, 2013, http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/10/south-
africa-launches-national-cyber-security-advisory-council/ (describing South Africa’s “National Cyber 
Security Policy Framework,” a statute that seeks to foster cooperation between the government, private 
sector, and civil society in the realm of cyber security); Kelly Ng, Cyber Security Remains a Priority for 
Singapore Government, FUTUREGOV (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.futuregov.asia/articles/2014/jan/29/cyber-security-remains-priority-singapore-governme/ 
(summarizing the Singaporean government’s strategy to improve cyber security in the country; embedded 
in the strategy are partnerships between the government and the Singaporean private sector). 
22 See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. 185, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.  
23 See Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital Divide’: Analyzing the 
Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 119, 141 (2014) (describing the “International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats,” a 
comprehensive alliance against cyber threats that is tasked with providing cybersecurity assistance and 
support to the International Telecommunication Union’s 192 member–states as well as to other United 
Nations organizations). 
24 See infra Part IV (providing background information on the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral 
export regime that controls the export of, inter alia, cyber technology products). 
25 Michael Lipson, The Reincarnation of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls, 6 
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 33, 33 (quoting William W. Keller, The Political Economy of Conventional Arms 
Proliferation, 96 CURRENT HIST. 179 (1997)). 
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exports. Part III summarizes key elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Part IV 
examines the December 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement. Part V argues 
that the Wassenaar Arrangement, even with the addition of the December 2013 
amendment, is ill-equipped to stem the export of dangerous cyber technologies for 
historical, institutional, and theoretical reasons. Part VI concludes. 
II. EXPORT CONTROLS AT A GLANCE 
¶5  Also known as “export restraints” or “export restrictions,” export controls are defined 
as “measures instituted by exporting countries to supervise export flows.”26 Governments 
utilize export controls to manage the flow of goods, services, and technologies across 
borders. Export controls are different from export bans in that the former give government 
regulators the legal authority to review, approve, and deny exports.27 Generally, 
governments manage exports as a means of implementing any number of public policy 
objectives. Some products are controlled in order to support domestic industries.28 Other 
products are controlled for the maintenance of the admittedly amorphous concept of 
“international security.” Professor Philippe Achilleas explains international security in the 
following way: 
The protection of international security is based on three complementary 
techniques. Firstly, there is disarmament, which is aimed at eliminating one 
category of weapon. Secondly, there is arms control, which is aimed at reducing 
the risk of war, making it less destructive when war starts, and reducing defense 
costs through the signing of agreements between countries. These agreements are 
aimed at reducing, limiting or regulating the use of certain weapons. Finally, non-
proliferation is aimed at preventing the development and sale of particular 
weapons.29 
¶6  Although export control regimes do not contribute to the first technique described 
above, which is better represented by initiatives like disarmament treaties,30 multilateral 
 
26 Joanna Bonarriva, Michelle Koscielski, & Edward Wilson, Export Controls: An Overview of Their 
Use, Economic Effects, and Treatment in the Global Trading System 1 (Office of Industries, U.S. Int’l 
Trade Commission, Working Paper No. ID-23, 2009), available at 
www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ID-23.pdf (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 Tim Maurer, Exporting the Right to Privacy, SLATE (May 15, 2014, 7:54 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/05/wassenaar_arrangement_u_s_export_contro
l_reform_keeping_surveillance_tech.html.  
28 See, e.g., Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An 
Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market Principles of United States 
Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INT’L L. J. 99, 99 (1986) (“In May of 1981, the Japanese government announced 
that it would restrict the number of automobiles its car manufacturers exported to the United States market 
during the following three years. This restriction was the apparent result of intense political pressure by 
domestic industry and labor organizations.”). 
29 Philippe Achilleas, International Regimes, in EXPORT CONTROL LAW AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK 
20 (Yann Aubin & Arnaud Idiart eds., 2007). 
30 Disarmament treaties generally take three forms: security disarmament treaties, humanitarian 
disarmament treaties, and hybrid disarmament treaties. Bonnie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The 
Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Disarmament Law, 15 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 
7, 12 (2010). Security disarmament treaties “focus on the elimination of certain weapons of war.“ Id. 
Vol. 13:2] Innokenty Pyetranker 
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export controls geared towards controlling the spread of potentially dangerous cutting-edge 
technologies—the subject of this Article—function as part of the latter two techniques. 
That is, these types of export controls aim to both moderate the destructiveness of cyber 
conflicts (arms control) and preemptively forestall the transfer of weaponizable 
technologies (non-proliferation). Countries are incentivized to participate in export control 
agreements for essentially the same reasons. Indeed, Professors Ron Smith and Bernard 
Udis posit that a state might participate in an export control regime to, inter alia, stop the 
spread of weapons that “may prolong a war,” avert both “an expensive arms race” and 
“pre-emptive aggression,” and “prevent the sale of weapons to a potential enemy.”31 
¶7  Modern export controls emerged during the Cold War. After receiving reports 
detailing the Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology for military purposes, the 
United States and its allies “worried that, as Lenin had predicted, the Capitalist West would 
sell the Communist East the rope with which to hang it.”32 In response, Western Bloc 
powers formed the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Multinational Trade 
(CoCom) to prevent the transfer of arms, nuclear-related items, and dual-use technologies 
to the Eastern Bloc.33 Following the end of the Cold War, CoCom was disbanded and 
replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, a regime that embraced many former Eastern Bloc 
countries as “parties rather than adversaries.”34 
¶8  Commonly known as “the Wassenaar Arrangement” or “the Arrangement,” the 
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies is but one element of today’s multilateral export control system; that 
system comprises four “separate and almost wholly independent” regimes.35 Aside from 
 
Humanitarian disarmament treaties focus on “reduc[ing] the suffering of individuals in times of war.” Id. at 
16. Hybrid disarmament treaties “represent a blend of elements characteristic of security disarmament and 
humanitarian disarmament, while moving increasingly toward the latter.” Id. at 13. 
31 Ron Smith & Bernard Udis, New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?, 8 
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 81, 82 (2001). 
32 Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology Transfers 
in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 450 (2003). See also Robert Y. Stebbings, 
Export Controls: Extraterritorial Conflict—The Dilemma of the Host Country Employee, 19 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 303, 313 (1987) (“According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Soviet KGB is directing a massive 
campaign to acquire Western technology, coordinated at the highest levels of the Soviet government. 
Although deficient in military manpower and perhaps even firepower, the NATO countries have 
maintained a technological advantage over Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, defense experts wish to 
assure the maintenance of technological “lead time” by restricting exports and reexports of the most 
advanced technology and goods which can be used militarily, as well as commercially, or from which the 
technology can be gleaned.”) (citation omitted). 
33 See Corr, supra note 32, at 450-51. See also Stebbings, supra note 32, at 312 (“The main purpose of 
COCOM is to implement a system of multilateral control of various commodities and technical data that 
may affect the national security of a given member nation. COCOM member countries agree to monitor all 
imports and exports as they may affect each country’s national security. Reexportation from a COCOM 
member country to a “controlled country” is not allowed without consent from the original exporting 
member and requires a unanimous vote of COCOM members. Controlled countries include almost all 
communist nations, the interests of which are deemed inimical to the interests of the COCOM member 
nations. These nations are: Cuba, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Angola, Tibet, North Korea, South Africa, Libya, 
Nicaragua, Albania, Laos, Outer Mongolia, Namibia, the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact nations.”). 
34 Charles B. Shotwell, Export Controls: A Clash of Imperatives, in 1 THE GLOBAL CENTURY: 
GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 335, 455 (2001). 
35 Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the multilateral export control regime system, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. 
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the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is intended to “contribute to regional and international 
security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility” in the global 
trade of munitions and dual-use products, the other three regimes are the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime.36 The Nuclear 
Suppliers Group is made up of countries that have been working together to restrict the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1992.37 The Australia Group focused only on 
“international export controls on chemical weapons precursor chemicals” when it was first 
formed in 1985, but eventually the organization “expanded its focus to include chemical 
production equipment and technologies and measures to prevent the proliferation of 
biological weapons.”38 Created in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime includes 
“member countries that have agreed to coordinate their national export controls to stem 
missile proliferation.”39 The principal aim of all four regimes is to control exports of certain 
items via the coordination and harmonization of member states’ nonproliferation policies.40 
III. THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT 
¶9  In July 1996, representatives of 33 countries met in Vienna, Austria and agreed to go 
forward with the Wassenaar Arrangement.41 To implement the agreement, the founding 
members of the Arrangement placed export controls on items enumerated in two lists: the 
Munitions List and the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.42 “Munitions” are easy 
to conceptualize as they are basically synonymous with military weapons; munitions that 
are regulated by the Arrangement include bombs, torpedoes, and grenades.43 “Dual-use 
goods and technologies” are best explained by way of illustration: 
 A personal computer (PC) is the quintessential example of an item that has 
both military and commercial purposes. John Q. Citizen in America uses his Apple 
Powerbook laptop to keep his financial house in order, a commercial use of a PC. 
However, an underground terrorist organization in a dark corner of the world could 
use that same Powerbook to build a dirty bomb, using the laptop for weapons 
 
L. 181, 183 (2004). 
36 Multilateral Export Control Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/multilateral-export-
control-regimes (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 See Joyner, supra note 35, at 184-85. 
41 See Press Statement, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL 
ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES (July 12, 1996), 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/1996/press120796.html. The 33 countries were Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.  
42 See id. 
43 List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON 
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 170 (2013), 
http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2013/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201/WA-
LIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf. 
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proliferation. Therefore, the laptop is a “dual use” item - it has both commercial 
and military applications.44 
¶10  In setting up the Arrangement, members of the group had four primary goals. First, 
members sought to promote “transparency and greater responsibility with regard to 
transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies” and thereby forestall 
“destabilizing accumulations” of those items.45 Second, members aspired to use domestic 
policies to ensure that transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies 
would not contribute to the development of military capabilities.46 Third, members wanted 
to complement and reinforce “the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction 
and their delivery systems, as well as other internationally recognized measures designed 
to promote transparency and greater responsibility.”47 Fourth, members were interested in 
“enhancing cooperation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use 
items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behavior of a state is, or 
becomes, a cause for serious concern.”48 To achieve these collective goals, the founding 
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement committed to sharing information, controlling the 
distribution of items on the munitions and dual-use lists, and notifying one another of 
transfers and denials of listed items to non-members.49  
¶11  The declared goals of the Wassenaar Arrangement, lofty as they may be, have always 
been subject to institutional realities. The earnest commitments made by member states are 
not really enforceable.50 Those enforcement issues are only worsened by the 
Arrangement’s notification mechanisms.51 Funding for the Arrangement is far from 
transparent and only mentioned once in its guiding documents.52 And reforming any of the 
Arrangement’s flaws is a tough row to hoe because all decisions need to be “reached by 
consensus of the Participating States.”53 Consensus-based decision-making plainly 
becomes harder as the number of decision-makers grows. Decision-making proved 
difficult with the thirty-three original members; with new additions Croatia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Slovenia, and South Africa, the organization now 
embraces forty-one member states.54 Technically, the Arrangement could become even 
 
44 Jordan Collins, Same Laws, Different Century: The Bureau of Industry & Security’s Role in Global 
Trade & National Security, 15 CURRENTS INT’L L. J. 108, 110 (2006). 




49 See Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 519, 520 
(2002) (“The Wassenaar Arrangement attempts to control proliferation of dual-use technologies through a 
variety of mechanisms, including controls on distribution, information-sharing among member states, and 
notification of transfers or denials of dual-use goods to non-member states.”) (citation omitted). 
50 See infra Part V.B.1 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement’s enforceability problems). 
51 See infra Part V.B.2 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement’s counterproductive notification 
provisions). 
52 Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON 
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2014), 
http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/Guidelines%20and%20procedures%20including%20the%20Init
ial%20Elements.pdf (“Financial needs of the Arrangement will be covered under annual budgets, to be 
adopted by Plenary Meetings.”). 
53 Id. 
54 Participating States, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 5  
 
 162 
more unwieldy in the future; more countries could theoretically join the Arrangement 
provided they fulfill the “agreed membership criteria,” which include adherence to the 
other three multilateral export control regimes and maintenance of both “adequate” export 
controls and “responsible” policies towards countries that threaten international peace and 
security.55  
IV. THE CYBER AMENDMENT TO THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT 
¶12  The Wassenaar Arrangement’s control lists are not static; members agreed from the 
beginning that the lists would “be reviewed regularly to reflect technological developments 
and experience gained by Participating States.”56 With a cyber menace looming on the 
horizon57 and no single international agency or body with the mandate to deal with cyber-
security, the Wassenaar Arrangement eventually sprang into action. Growing calls for 
action on matters of cybersecurity came to fruition during a December 2013 meeting.58 
Following that meeting, the Arrangement issued a public statement proclaiming that 
member states had agreed on new export controls for technologies that “under certain 
conditions, may be detrimental to international and regional security and stability.”59 
Daniel Reisner and Doron Hindin suggest that these new export controls, which effectively 
constituted a “cyber amendment,” were a bid “to curtail the proliferation of ‘active’ or 
‘offensive’ cyber technologies [that are] used to initiate offensive cyber attacks or actively 
mine and analyze protected data.”60 
 
ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
55 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20517, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EXPORT CONTROLS: THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2006), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20517.pdf. 
56 Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 4. 
57 See supra Part I (explaining the dangers emanating from cyberspace). 
58 See Sam Jones, Arms deal sets limits on cyber technologies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4653c82-641d-11e3-98e2-00144feabdc0.html (explaining that leaders of 
Wassenaar Arrangement member states were particularly concerned about “the notion that technologies 
may end up in the hands of terrorist groups or hostile organisations and be used to thwart western 
surveillance operations or mount cyber attacks.”). See also Willie Jones, Treaty Limiting Weapons Exports 
Updated to Include Cyberweapons, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 6, 2013, 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/treaty-limiting-weapons-exports-updated-to-include-
cyberweapons (“Diplomats representing several Western governments are huddling in Vienna this week in 
the hopes of finalizing new, Internet-related additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement. That pact—under 
which the United States, Russia, Japan, France, Germany and dozens of other signatories agree to strictly 
limit exports of certain weapons—is being updated in order to control access to complex surveillance and 
hacking software and cryptography. These countries hope to keep sophisticated cyberweapons out of what 
they consider to be the wrong hands despite explosive growth (pun intended) in the cybersnooping 
market.”).  
59 Plenary Statement: 2013 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT 
CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2013), 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2013/WA%20Plenary%20Public%20Statement%202013.pdf.  
60 Daniel Reisner & Doron Hindin, Caught by surprise: Israel’s export control regime and cyber 
technologies, WORLDECR, 29 (2014). See also Sam Jones, Cyber war technology to be controlled in same 
way as arms, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2903d504-5c18-11e3-931e-
00144feabdc0.html (describing the December 2013 Wassenaar Arrangement meeting as one in which 
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¶13  The cyber amendment was manifested in a number of changes to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement’s control list of dual-use goods and technologies; two changes called for 
member states to apply new export controls to software.61 One such change was the 
addition of category 5.A.1.j, which mandates export controls on certain forms of software 
and associated goods, specifically “IP network communications surveillance systems or 
equipment, and specially designed components therefor.”62 The technology in question 
must perform certain functions on a “carrier class IP Network” and be “specifically 
designed” to carry out specified processes.63 The former requires “[a]nalysis at the 
application layer,” “[e]xtraction of selected metadata and application content,” and the 
“indexing” of this extracted data.64 The latter requires that the technology was designed 
either for the “[e]xecution of searches on the basis of ‘hard selectors’” or for “[m]apping 
of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people.”65 
¶14  The other change was the addition of category 4.A.5, which calls on member states 
to apply export controls to “[s]ystems, equipment, and components therefor, specially 
designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, 
‘intrusion software.’”66 The Arrangement defines “intrusion software” as: 
“Software” specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 
“monitoring tools,” or to defeat “protective countermeasures,” of a 
computer or network-capable device, and performing any of the following: 
(a) The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network-
capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or (b) The 
modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order 
to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.67 
 
member states were trying to reach “an agreement to put sensitive cyber security technologies on the same 
footing as regular armaments”). 
61 Sam Jones, supra note 58 (explaining that the cyber amendment called on Wassenaar Arrangement 
members to place controls on “sales of internet communications surveillance systems and intrusion 
software”). 
62 List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON 
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 81 (2013), 
http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2013/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201/WA-
LIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf. 
63 Id. Category 5.A.l.j reads in full: 
IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment, and specially designed 
components therefor, having all of the following:  
1. Performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network (e.g., national grade IP 
backbone):  a. Analysis at the application layer (e.g., Layer 7 of Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1));  
 b. Extraction of selected metadata and application content (e.g., voice, video, 
messages, attachments); and  
 c. Indexing of extracted data; and  
2. Being specially designed to carry out all of the following:  
 a. Execution of searches on the basis of ‘hard selectors’; and  
 b. Mapping of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 73. 
67 Id. at 209. 
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The Arrangement defines the term “software” as “[a] collection of one or more 
‘programmes’ or ‘microprogrammes’ fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”68  
¶15  Both additions to the Wassenaar Arrangement are meant to address threats posed by 
cyber technology, focusing primarily on software that facilitates data mining and analysis. 
Software qualifying under the Arrangement’s revised rubric is now subject to export 
controls.  
V. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF THE 2013 CYBER AMENDMENT 
¶16  Despite the hoopla surrounding the changes made at the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 
December 2013 meeting, the cyber amendment may prove to be ineffective in controlling 
the proliferation of dangerous cyber technologies for historical, institutional, and 
theoretical reasons. 
A. Historical Argument 
¶17  Attempts to control the flow of technology across borders have not always been 
successful. The most relevant failure in recent memory is the U.S.-sponsored effort to 
restrict the export of encryption technology via the Wassenaar Arrangement in the late 
1990s.  
¶18  An encryption program generally encodes information in “an unintelligible form”69 
and thereby ensures the “confidentiality of communications.”70 More technically:  
Encryption permits transformation of passwords or messages into a form 
that cannot be understood without access to special information necessary 
to decode the password or message. Messages are scrambled by application 
of a mathematical algorithm. The algorithm allows the user to select a key. 
The key allows the user to decrypt messages. Encryption strength increases 
with the length of the key. Key length is generally measured in bits.71 
Encryption technology is dual-use in that it can be used to, for instance, protect consumer 
data72 (a civilian purpose) and intercept enemy communications during armed conflict and 
prevent terrorist attacks73 (military purposes).  
 
68 Id. at 218. The term “programme” is given the following definition: “A sequence of instructions to 
carry out a process in, or convertible into, a form executable by an electronic computer.” Id. at 214. A 
“microprogramme” is defined as “[a] sequence of elementary instructions maintained in a special storage, 
the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruction register.” Id. at 211. 
69 Mark T. Pasko, Re-Defining National Security in the Technology Age: The Encryption Export Debate, 
26 J. LEGIS. 337, 337 (2000).  
70 Corr, supra note 32, at 484. 
71 Id. at 484 n.174 (quoting Bernadette Barnard, Leveraging Worldwide Encryption Standards via U.S. 
Export Controls: The U.S. Government’s Authority to “Safeguard” the Global Information Infrastructure, 
1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 433-35 (1997)). 
72 See, e.g., Sophie Curtis, Small businesses urged to encrypt data after London sole trader fined £5,000, 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 26, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10336836/Small-
businesses-urged-to-encrypt-data-after-London-sole-trader-fined-5000.html.  
73 See Thinh Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United 
States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 668-69 (1997) (“For millennia, people have 
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¶19  The potential for encryption programs to be exploited by criminal elements 
galvanized many jurisdictions—including the European Union74 and the United States75—
to regulate encryption technology exports to varying degrees. The U.S. government has 
long had an exceptional interest in controlling cryptographic exports because of the role 
that encryption plays in the U.S. economy76 and the U.S. law enforcement system.77 Thus, 
Washington has long imposed severe restrictions on exports of encryption technology.78 
The U.S. lobbied to extend those restrictions beyond its borders at a 1998 Wassenaar 
Arrangement meeting and was successful. As a result, the Arrangement placed encryption 
technology on the dual-use list and Arrangement members specifically agreed to restrict 
the export of encryption software with numerical keys above 64 bits in length.79 
 
employed cryptography as a tool for securing communications, and for equally as long, other people have 
tried to decode those messages. During World War II, the Allies were able to break a secret German code, 
called Enigma. With this capability, they were able to locate and sink large numbers of German U-boats 
and obtain advanced information about German military operations that was critical to the campaign in 
Europe. Similar code-breaking ability also allowed the United States Navy to intercept the Japanese fleet in 
one of the most decisive battles in the Pacific—the Battle of Midway. During the Cold War, signals 
intelligence provided information about the Soviet Union‘s military capabilities, the downing of Korean 
Airlines Flight 007, and Libyan involvement in the bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. 
More recently, intercepted communications have been used to reveal unfair trading practices by competing 
nations, monitor proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enforce international sanctions, identify 
conventional military threats, and prevent terrorism.”) (citations omitted). 
74 Nathan Saper, International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy, 11 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 673, 682 (2013) (“Cryptography in the European Union (EU), like in the U.S., is 
free to use domestically, but faces restriction on its export.”). 
75 See, e.g., Pasko, supra note 69 (“While encryption offers American industry a tremendous advantage 
in conducting its business by ensuring that transactions and industrial secrets are kept safe, encryption also 
offers many opportunities for misuse. Criminal activities that use encryption technology to their advantage, 
such as terrorism, organized crime, and industrial espionage have prompted the federal government to enact 
strong laws regulating encryption in order to prevent such misuse.”); Saper, supra note 74, at 677 (“The 
United States pioneered the efforts to regulate encryption during the Cold War.”). 
76 See Shotwell, supra note 34, at 339 (explaining that some financial transactions in the United States 
are protected by encryption technology).  
77 See Karim K. Shehadeh, The Wassenaar Arrangement and Encryption Exports: An Ineffective Export 
Control Regime that Compromises United States’ Economic Interests, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 271, 283-84 
(1999) (“Essentially, law enforcement advocates argue that widespread use of encryption would hamper 
intelligence gathering and undermine the ability of law enforcement to prevent crime. A recently published 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) report states that ‘[e]ncryption can also be used to conceal criminal 
activity and thwart law enforcement efforts to collect critical evidence needed to prevent, solve and 
prosecute serious and often violent criminal activities, including illegal drug trafficking, organized crime, 
child pornography, and terrorism.’ For instance, law enforcement officials cite examples where strong 
encryption frustrated court-authorized crime interdiction efforts. Recent terrorist incidents also heighten 
fears that strong encryption has already become a vital tool used by terrorists and drug cartels to evade 
detection by law enforcement officials.”) (citations omitted). 
78 See Ioannis Iglezakis, Regulation of Cryptography and Other Dual-use Goods, in CYBER LAW IN 
GREECE 67, 71 (Dimitrios Maniotis, Michail-Theodoros Marinos, Apostolos Anthimos, Ioannis Iglezakis, 
& George Nouskalis, eds., 2011) (“The USA has imposed severe restrictions on cryptography exports. The 
export of cryptographic products was subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) until 
1996 and then exports were transferred to the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR). ITAR restricted export of ‘dual-use’ cryptography, which was included in the 
munitions list.”). 
79 See Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 298. 
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¶20  A mere month after the meeting, however, the Arrangement’s consensus on 
encryption technology began to break. The French government, citing “its desire to 
improve the ability of its citizens to protect their confidential communications and its wish 
to remove obstacles to the growth of e-commerce,” announced that it would drop “all 
controls on encryption technology up to 128-bits.”80 Other Arrangement members, namely 
Germany and Finland, opposed any restrictions whatsoever on the export of encryption 
software.81 And, further undermining the Arrangement’s consensus, non-members with 
fewer controls on encryption technology ended up benefitting from the Arrangement’s 
restrictions. Switzerland, for instance, quickly became a thriving center for encryption-
software production.82  
¶21  Finally, because of the widespread use of the Internet, export controls on encryption 
technology eventually “lost any effect.”83 Professor Ioannis Iglezakis explains, “[S]ince 
encryption programs can be downloaded from everywhere in seconds . . . it seems 
impossible for countries to limit dissemination of such programs.”84 Eventually, the 
ineffectiveness of these export controls forced the United States “to rethink its encryption 
priorities and develop a new strategy.”85 
¶22  The cyber amendment appears strikingly similar to the encryption-related 
amendment passed in the late 1990s. That is, analogous to encryption technologies, many 
of the cyber technology programs added by the recent amendment are dual-use, software-
based products. For this reason, the failure of the Wassenaar Arrangement to control the 
export of encryption software lends support to the theory that the cyber amendment will 
also likely fail. 
B. Institutional Argument 
¶23  The Wassenaar Arrangement’s effectiveness is seriously hindered by inadequate 
enforcement rules and the lack of a ban on undercutting; both defects are rooted in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement’s written guidelines. These organizational weaknesses stymie the 
Arrangement’s ability to control the cross-border flow of cyber technologies.  
1. Lack of Binding Enforcement Provisions 
¶24  The Wassenaar Arrangement is multilateral in scope. Nevertheless, each 
Arrangement member must take two distinct unilateral steps for the regime to function 
properly: refrain from thwarting the enactment of collectively beneficial regulations and 
refrain from disregarding collectively beneficial regulations that have already been 
enacted. The Arrangement’s guiding documents contain no provisions for persuading 
 
80 Pasko, supra note 69, at 351. 
81 Shotwell, supra note 34, at 339. 
82 Iglezakis, supra note 78 (“[S]ome countries (e.g., Switzerland) have benefitted from this situation by 
promoting the lack of controls in their territory.). See also Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 275 (“[W]hile 
United States encryption exporters were frustrated by domestic export policies that remained more 
restrictive than Wassenaar, foreign manufacturers were operating in less restrictive environments.”). 
83 Iglezakis, supra note 78. 
84 Id. In an interconnected and globalized world, controlling the export of intangible products, including 
encryption programs, is inherently difficult. See infra Part V.C. 
85 Pasko, supra note 69, at 351. 
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member states that are obstinate during the enactment process or for punishing member 
states that refuse to abide by Arrangement regulations. Thus, the regime can be rendered 
ineffectual with regard to cyber technology if (1) any member states refuse to add 
previously unregulated forms of cyber technology to the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control 
list of dual-use goods and technologies or (2) any member states fail to abide by the 
strictures of the cyber amendment or any other Wassenaar Arrangement regulation. 
¶25  Because the Wassenaar Arrangement operates on the principle that all decisions must 
be supported by all members, the first unilateral step that every member state must take is 
to abstain from obstructing the regime’s consensuses on controlled items and controlled 
destinations.86 In theory, the consensus-based system protects each state’s individual 
interests; at the same time, the system elevates a single state’s individual interests above 
the group’s collective interests. This is problematic when conflicting interests arise among 
Arrangement members. The incentive to sell certain goods to certain customers, for 
instance, might compel countries to act against collective interests.87 Even the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization—which has a system of collective defense that forces at least 
some alignment in the political and security interests of member states—is not immune to 
individual economic motivations taking precedence over other considerations; the French 
government’s initial reluctance to cancel its €1.2 billion contract to sell helicopter assault 
ships to Russia, despite pleas from France’s NATO allies following the downing of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine,88 was only the latest 
and most high-profile example of this incentive in action.  
¶26  The second unilateral step that every Wassenaar Arrangement member takes is to put 
the regime’s consensus-based, collectively agreed-upon control lists into action. Much like 
the prior step, this is ultimately a matter of discretion. That is, the Arrangement’s guiding 
documents guarantee that “[t]he decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item will be 
the sole responsibility of each Participating State. . . . All measures undertaken . . . will be 
in accordance with national legislation and policies and will be implemented on the basis 
of national discretion.”89 But since the Arrangement’s written guidelines do not include 
any enforcement mechanisms, the Arrangement imposes “no obligation on its signatories 
to enact domestic legislation consistent with its provisions.”90 Furthermore, even if a 
member state chooses to pass laws that effectuate the purposes of the Arrangement, that 
member state faces no penalty from the Arrangement for failing to enforce those laws. This 
point is encapsulated by the following conversation between Connecticut Senator Joseph 
Lieberman and the U.S. State Department’s Senior Advisor for Arms Control and 
International Security John Holum during a congressional hearing on the Wassenaar 
Arrangement: 
 
86 See supra Part III (explaining the Wassenaar Arrangement’s consensus-based decision-making 
system). 
87 See infra Part V.C.1 (discussing the economic incentives underlying state behavior). 
88 See Hugh Carnegy & Peter Spiegel, Row erupts over French warship ahead of European sanctions 
talks, FIN. TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36d15660-1163-11e4-a17a-
00144feabdc0.html. Note that France decided to suspend delivery of the helicopter assault ships in late 
2014 when the situation in Ukraine worsened. See Stacy Meichtry & Gregory L. White, France Suspends 
Delivery of Warship to Russia, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-halts-
plans-to-deliver-warship-to-russia-1416919199. 
89 Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 3. 
90 Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 297. 
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Senator Lieberman[:] Help me understand. When a nation, when a member 
Nation of Wassenaar violates the agreement by exporting an item on the 
agreed upon list, what are the sanctions that are possible? 
Mr. Holum[:] Well, there are no sanctions because ultimately the decision 
making belongs to the countries.91 
¶27  With member states free to choose whether to enact controls on listed items and free 
to choose whether to enforce any enacted controls, reaching a consensus on controlled 
items and controlled destinations—the first unilateral action described above—turns out to 
be of little consequence. By virtue of their membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
members are not bound to do anything at all. In this light, the Arrangement is nothing more 
than an organization for sharing information about export controls without the institutional 
teeth to actually control exports.  
2. Lack of a Rule Forbidding Undercutting 
¶28  a) Undercutting Explained.—Unlike the other three multilateral export control 
regimes, the guidelines governing the Wassenaar Arrangement do not incorporate a rule 
forbidding undercutting, or a “no undercut rule,”92 which would prohibit members of an 
export control regime from exporting “any listed item or items that had been officially 
denied an export license by another member.”93 Professor Daniel Joyner explains the 
importance of such a rule: 
When a denial of an export license for an item on a control list is made at 
the national level, member states under this rule are to notify the regime. 
This is a crucial element in ensuring member states that the restrictive 
policies of the regime will not be abrogated to the financial gain of one or a 
few members, to the corresponding loss of the remainder of member states 
whose positions have thereby been undercut and to the mooting of regime 
principles.94 
¶29  In lieu of a proper no undercut rule for dual-use goods like cyber technology, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement provides for notification procedures. These procedures are 
primarily described in three paragraphs: paragraph 4 of section II and paragraphs 1 and 2 
of section V. Paragraph 4 of section II spells out the steps that member states must take in 
notifying other members about denials of export requests: 
 
91 The Wassenaar Arrangement and the Future of Multilateral Export Controls: Hearing before the 
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg64899/html/CHRG-106shrg64899.htm.  
92 Joyner, supra note 35, at 185 n.8 (“The Wassenaar Arrangement is the only one of the [four 
multilateral export control] regimes without these denial notification/no undercut policies.”). 
93 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1095, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHALLENGES WITH 
COMMERCE’S VALIDATED END-USER PROGRAM MAY LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT 
SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT EXPORTED TO CHINA IS USED AS INTENDED 10 (2008). 
94 Joyner, supra note 35, at 185 (emphasis added). 
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4. In accordance with the provisions of this Arrangement, Participating 
States agree to notify transfers and denials. These notifications will apply 
to all nonparticipating states. However, in the light of the general and 
specific information exchange, the scope of these notifications, as well as 
their relevance for the purposes of the Arrangement, will be reviewed. 
Notification of a denial will not impose an obligation on other Participating 
States to deny similar transfers. However, a Participating State will notify, 
preferably within 30 days, but no later than within 60 days, all other 
Participating States of an approval of a licence which has been denied by 
another Participating State for an essentially identical transaction during the 
last three years.95 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section V provide additional procedural instructions regarding 
notifications: 
1. Participating States will notify licences denied to non-participants with 
respect to items on the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, where 
the reasons for denial are relevant to the purposes of the Arrangement. 
2. For the Dual-Use List, Participating States will notify all licences denied 
relevant to the purposes of the Arrangement to non-participating states, on 
an aggregate basis, twice per year.96 
Conspicuously missing from the three cited paragraphs is a rule forbidding member states 
from exporting dual-use items to a recipient after receiving notification that a fellow 
Arrangement member denied that recipient an export license. The closest the guidelines 
come to such a rule is the “essentially identical transaction” provision in paragraph 4 of 
section II, and that provision is extremely limited in nature: it only applies to sensitive 
items and it only mandates notification—not denial—within a maximum of 60 days after 
a license approval.97  
¶30  b. Undercutting in Action.—A no undercut rule’s impact is illustrated best via 
hypothetical. Suppose a multilateral export control regime called the “Lumber Control 
Regime” is created to control the export of lumber. Suppose further that a type of lumber 
called “olivewood” falls within a category of the Lumber Control Regime’s control list. 
Finally, suppose the countries of “Woodland” and “Timberstan” are founding members of 
 
95 Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, supra note 52, at 3. 
96 Id. at 5. 
97 See GRIMMETT, supra note 55, at 5 (“The Arrangement does not prohibit a participating country from 
making an export to a particular destination that has been denied by another participant (this practice is 
called ‘undercutting’). But participants are required to notify other participants within 60 days, and 
preferably within 30 days, after they approve a license for an export of sensitive dual-use goods that are 
essentially identical to those that have been denied by another participant during the previous three years.“). 
See also Jaffer, supra note 49, at 521-522 (“[T]he Wassenaar Arrangement contains only the weakest of 
provisions to assist member nations in ensuring that their export license denials are not undercut by other 
member nations. The no undercut provisions contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement require member 
nations to provide information about exports they deny, as well as notification when a member transfers 
technology or goods that are essentially identical to products denied by other members.”) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the Lumber Control Regime but the country of “Pariahguay” is deliberately excluded from 
membership because it is widely considered to be a state sponsor of terrorism. When a 
Woodland company applies to the Woodland government for a license to export olivewood 
to Pariahguay and the Woodland government rejects the company’s application, the 
existence of a no undercut rule matters a great deal. With a no undercut rule in place, 
Woodland’s subsequent notification of the rejection forbids all members of the Lumber 
Control Regime from exporting olivewood to Pariahguay. Without a no undercut rule, 
however, Woodland’s notification becomes a notification—if not an advertisement—that 
Pariahguayan companies seek to import olivewood. Most importantly, nothing precludes 
Timberstani political leaders from approving the applications of Timberstani companies 
eager to export olivewood to Pariahguay. Woodland’s rejection of an export license could 
thereby facilitate the derogation of the Lumber Control Regime’s principles.  
¶31  As demonstrated in the above hypothetical, the absence of a no undercut rule works 
against the Wassenaar Arrangement because “[a] country denying an export license 
essentially notifies all other members of a sales opportunity.”98 Accordingly, this situation 
“may actually create a perverse incentive for the denying member to decline to report the 
denial because of the concern that it will simply be providing other members with an export 
opportunity.”99 No wonder the Arrangement currently receives “scant attention from the 
policy community” and “ridicule from the arms lobby.”100 
C. Theoretical Argument 
¶32  There are three theoretical reasons that the cyber amendment to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement will fail to stifle the dissemination of destabilizing cyber products. First, 
member states and companies in those member states are incentivized to sell exports—
such as cyber products—to as many buyers as possible. Second, keeping cyber technology 
within a nation or group of nations will be problematic as advances in the technology are 
made in an increasingly borderless world.  Third, the intangibility inherent in software 
products makes it well-nigh impossible to control their flow across borders. 
1. Economic Incentives Motivate Governments and Private Actors to Ignore the Cyber 
Amendment 
¶33  The Wassenaar Arrangement’s unenforceability101 renders it dependent on the 
voluntary compliance of governments and businesses.102 The private sector did not always 
 
98 Michael D. Klaus, Dual-Use Free Trade Agreements: The Contemporary Alternative to High-Tech 
Export Controls, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 115 (2003) (citation omitted). 
99 Jaffer, supra note 49, at 522. 
100 William W. Keller & Janne E. Nolan, Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Threat to Stability, in 
THE GLOBAL CENTURY: GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 785, 800-01 (Richard L. Kugler & 
Ellen L. Frost eds., 2002). 
101 See supra Part V.B.1 (describing the Wassenaar Arrangement‘s enforceability problems). 
102 See Heinz Gartner, The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA): How it is Broken and Needs to be Fixed, 24 
DEF. & SEC. ANALYSIS 53, 54 (2008) (“The WA is not a traditional arms control and disarmament 
agreement, as it is not legally binding on the state parties. Enforcement relies on co-operation and voluntary 
compliance, with governments and industries representing the two most important actors in the agreement’s 
dynamics.”). 
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play a significant role in dual-use technology innovation, as Professors William Keller and 
Janne Nolan explain: 
From the 1950s at least through the 1970s, the lead investor in 
communications, computers, and semiconductors in the United States was 
the Department of Defense. Pentagon research and development accounted 
for some of the most significant technical advances, such as 
supercomputers, geosynchronous satellites, and integrated circuitry. Strict 
government controls over research and development minimized 
unregulated technological diffusion and formed the basis for restrictive 
instruments such as export controls and supplier cartels. Today, this 
situation is reversed.103 
Concerning this reversal, Professor Joyner further explains: 
[P]roduction of dual use technologies has shifted in large degree to elements 
of the private sector, as national governments have found that higher quality 
and lower prices are available ‘off the shelf’ in private markets. This shift 
has had the result of significantly decentralizing the production of sensitive 
items and requiring increased coordination between the private and public 
spheres.104 
As both government institutions and private sector institutions are integrally involved in 
the development of dual-use technology, their collaboration is a sine qua non for 
controlling exports of that technology. In other words, for an export control regime like the 
Wassenaar Arrangement to work, companies seeking to export certain items must apply to 
their national governments for export licenses and only proceed with sales upon receiving 
licenses. However, controlling exports this way is extraordinarily difficult because 
impeding sales in foreign markets runs counter to the interests of all of all parties involved, 
especially private sector businesses. That is, Wassenaar Arrangement member states—
which are individually responsible for controlling exports but are themselves incentivized 
to violate the Agreement and allow as many exports as possible—must rely on the 
cooperation of profit-seeking private sector companies with essentially unbalanced 
incentives to sidestep the Agreement. 
¶34  The mostly democratic and mostly capitalist members of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement face a strategic trade-off when it comes to export controls. On the one hand, 
national leaders are motivated to protect their nations’ security by curtailing the movement 
of potentially dangerous technologies.  On the other hand, national leaders are motivated 
to minimize regulations that hamper the economic activities of tax-paying companies that 
employ members of their electorates.105 These two conflicting incentives are apparent in 
 
103 Keller & Nolan, supra note 100, at 786. 
104 Joyner, supra note 35, at 186. 
105 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 44, at 108 (“Export controls, through the implementation of domestic 
policy and by participation in international agreements, evoke the importance of a nation’s most delicate 
balancing act: national security vs. economic competitiveness.”). Note that there may not necessarily be a 
contradiction between a country pursuing its security interests and its economic interests simultaneously 
when exporting defense and dual-use items. See Michael Hirsh, The Great Technology Giveaway?, 
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the actions taken by Arrangement members, who claim that they are “willing to support 
general WA [Wassenaar Arrangement] guidelines that address the concerns of all 
countries” but nevertheless “consistently and simultaneously oppose specific controls that 
might negatively impact their own export policies and decisions.”106 
¶35  That same strategic trade-off does not apply to businesses, which have no need to 
appeal to a security-sensitive electorate. Instead, for-profit enterprises generally seek to 
earn money for the benefit of owners or shareholders.107  Private sector prioritization of 
profits is intuitive, has been borne out innumerable times by the actions of businesses,108 
and is especially true now that the existential threat posed by the Cold War heating up has 
vanished.109 In fact, businesses are subject to such compelling economic incentives that, 
when faced with regulations akin to the cyber amendment, many might simply relocate to 
jurisdictions with fewer regulations. Due to globalization, businesses “set up shop 
wherever capital, labor, and market destinations make the most economic sense.”110  
¶36  Software companies that produce dual-use cyber technology can easily exploit the 
fact that programs can be sent to customers from any place with a functional Internet 
connection. Moreover, a software company’s only two indispensable factors of production 
are computers and qualified personnel; since neither factor is inordinately difficult to move 
across borders, software companies face relatively low transfer costs. These companies are 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1998, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54383/michael-hirsh/the-great-
technology-giveaway (“The idea that national security and commercial interests trade off—that every time 
you sell a satellite overseas, you make a profit but lose a little bit of your military edge—harks back to a 
time when CIA bean counters worried over every uptick in Soviet technology, and when the U.S. defense 
industry was sequestered in top-secret grandeur, spending untold billions on weapons designed exclusively 
for the Pentagon, with older generation models going to America’s Cold War allies. Today the situation 
could not be more different.”) Some have even argued that an exporting country’s security interests and 
economic interests go hand in hand. See Corr, supra note 32, at 444 n.3 (“Many in the Clinton 
Administration, including the Defense Department, recognized that the military increasingly relies on 
technological superiority, and that the civilian commercial sector, not the military industrial sector, drives 
technology. That sector, in turn, is increasingly dependent on exports. It is therefore tautological that for 
export control purposes you cannot at once strangle and promote the source of your technological 
superiority.”) (citations omitted). 
106 Gartner, supra note 102, at 55. 
107 See, e.g., id. (“Although the WA export control list could provide guidelines for future export 
decisions and export conduct for both state and non-state actors, it has little impact on specific export 
decisions. These remain largely driven by profit, growth, and investment opportunities. The main private 
actors involved in the WA—the exporting companies—remain vehemently opposed to the strict 
enforcement of effective export control measures.”). 
108 See, e.g., Jing-Dong Yuan, The Future of Export Controls: Developing New Strategies for 
Nonproliferation, 39 INT’L POLICY 131, 142 (2002) (“In certain cases, companies may simply disregard the 
implications of their technology transfers and, indeed, may cheat to obtain export licenses that allow a 
business advantage over potential competitors. For instance, in the late 1980s, a number of West German 
companies were found guilty of illegal exports of nuclear, chemical, and rocket items and relevant 
technologies to Middle Eastern countries, including Libya.”) (citation omitted).  
109 See, e.g., Hirsh, supra note 105 (describing how, in the post-Cold War era, American exporters such 
as Hughes Electronics, AT&T, Loral Space & Communications, and United Technologies carried out 
“intense corporate lobbying“ to pressure the U.S. government to reclassify certain munitions as dual-use 
items and thereby simplify and expedite the export process for those items); Keller & Nolan, supra note 
100, at 797 (noting that, following the Cold War, the desire of businesses “to sell into international markets 
has slowly but irresistibly taken precedence [over concerns about the diffusion of advanced technology].”).  
110 Yuan, supra note 108, at 141; see also infra Part V.C.2 (describing the behavior of companies in an 
increasingly globalized world). 
Vol. 13:2] Innokenty Pyetranker 
 173 
therefore well positioned to conduct regulatory arbitrage by moving their operations 
whenever they reassess their regulatory cost-benefit analyses.111 In fact, this is precisely 
what happened when the Wassenaar Arrangement placed strict controls on dual-use 
encryption technologies; over time, production of encryption software “thrived in countries 
with fewer controls.”112 
¶37  Thus, the two actors tasked with carrying out the directives of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement—the governments of Arrangement members and the private sector actors 
doing business in member states—are subject to strong incentives to disregard those 
directives. And, in practice, “aggressive and effective lobbying” by export-oriented 
companies has made member states progressively more tolerant of the fact that those 
companies openly flout many of the Arrangement’s regulations.113  
2. Innovations in Cyber Technology Will Occur in a Globalized World 
¶38  a. Whither Borders?—All export control regimes presuppose the existence of 
borders; the term “export” is meaningless in a borderless world. Consequently, as borders 
shrink in terms of significance, export control regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement 
will likewise shrink in terms of significance. And borders are indeed shrinking; the world 
economy is currently characterized by, inter alia, the “globalization of business” and “rapid 
technological innovation.”114 These two phenomena mutually and continually reinforce 
one another: technological innovations fuel increased globalization, increased 
globalization fuels yet more technological innovations, and so on. The speed and extent of 
technological innovation, most notably in the realm of communication, has transformed 
the global economy. Only historical comparison elucidates the sheer magnitude of 
technology’s impact:  
In 1830, for instance, it would have cost around $2,000 of today’s money 
to transmit one letter from London to India, and it could have taken up to 
six months to reach its destination. Today, a letter can be shipped 
internationally for $3 and reach its destination in only a few days. Going 
beyond that, the world is flush with near-instantaneous communication of 
all kinds, from tweets to SMS texts, and from instant messenger software to 
 
111 Note that seemingly immovable factors of production, such as factories, may also be moved across 
borders with relative ease. Jan Clenski, Moving with the times: Factory relocation forms basis for business 
model, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/645e407c-f05e-11df-88db-
00144feab49a.html. Nevertheless, a company that does not rely on any immovable assets is at least 
theoretically freer to relocate abroad than a company that does rely on immovable assets because the 
former literally has fewer things to transport. 
112 Iglezakis, supra note 78; see also Shehadeh, supra note 77, at 300-01 (“[S]tringent United States 
laws have led to a significant increase in the amount of encryption products that are available from foreign 
manufacturers. For instance, The Arrangement does not require members to control the intangible export of 
encryption software in cyberspace. In the United States, however, current regulations restrict the 
distribution of encryption software via the Internet. The foregoing has allowed software manufacturers 
from newly emerging countries to make their encryption software available over the Internet, and establish 
a reputation for security that United States-exported products cannot match in foreign markets.”). 
113 Gartner, supra note 102, at 55. 
114 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-43, NONPROLIFERATION: STRATEGY NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES 24 (2002). 
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calls via VoIP (voice-over Internet protocol). Technological change means 
not only that most types of global flows are growing in volume but also that 
global networks of flows are evolving more rapidly. As a result, the world 
is increasingly connected and dynamic—and potentially more volatile.115 
The connectedness, dynamism, and potential volatility described above apply to cyber 
technologies, which, as a result of innovation and globalization, can currently be exported 
in myriad ways. For instance, technologies may be “exported” by shipping data storage 
devices abroad, traveling with data storage devices, transmitting data via the Internet, 
allowing foreigners access to data inside of the exporting country, and allowing foreigners 
and non-foreigners access to data outside of the exporting country.116  Since controlling 
exports is naturally harder when the exporting process takes so many forms, globalization 
presents a formidable procedural challenge to export controls. On a more fundamental 
level, however, globalization poses a conceptual challenge to export controls. With borders 
becoming “porous” and technologies and information become “more transportable,” the 
inevitable result is that the “the underlying assumptions of programs to stem the flow of 
dual-use technologies and commodities come under question.”117  
¶39  b. Multinational Companies and Multinational Teams—Multinationalism has long 
been the order of the day for many tech companies in terms of producing and selling 
products and services. In recent years, research and development in high tech has likewise 
become a global affair. It is hardly news that companies like Sweden’s Ericsson, France’s 
Alcatel-Lucent, South Korea’s Samsung, America’s Motorola, and Germany’s Siemens 
outsource manufacture operations to places like China, India, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, 
and Thailand.118 Relatively unknown, however, is the fact that businesses use foreign 
countries as sites for innovation too; all five companies mentioned, for instance, have 
research campuses in China.119 San Jose-based eBay has an innovation hub in Tel Aviv.120 
Microsoft, a company headquartered in Redmond, Washington, boasts a research 
laboratory in Bangalore.121 To inspire Google employees to be innovative no matter where 
they sit, the company provides perks like “ski gondolas in the Zurich office, a pub-like 
 
115 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, GLOBAL FLOWS IN A DIGITAL AGE: HOW TRADE, FINANCE, PEOPLE, 
AND DATA CONNECT THE WORLD ECONOMY 20 (2014), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights/Globalization/Global%20flows%20in%20a
%20digital%20age/MGI_Global_flows_in_a_digial_age_Full_report.ashx (citations omitted). 
116 See Corr, supra note 32, at 472-73. See also Keller & Nolan, supra note 100, at 785 (“Technological 
change is transforming the context of international security and commerce. The rapid expansion of cross-
border trade and the free flow of intellectual as well as financial capital brought on by technological 
advances have made our national borders porous.”). 
117 Shotwell, supra note 34, at 336. 
118 See THEODORE MORAN, DEALING WITH CYBERSECURITY THREATS POSED BY GLOBALIZED 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS 3 (2013), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-11.pdf. 
119 See id. 
120 Improving the Customer Experience, LEADERS, 
http://www.leadersmag.com/issues/2014.3_Jul/Entrepreneurship/LEADERS-Dafan-Gura-Goldenberg-
Parnes-Matalon-Schory-eBay.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“The Israel Innovation Center (IIC) is a self-
contained, off-platform team based in Tel Aviv, Israel…The IIC is part of the newly formed Innovation and 
New Ventures group, created to act as the center of innovation, which includes creating new businesses, 
and supporting the eBay Marketplaces businesses and eBay Inc. at a corporate level.”). 
121 Dinesh C. Sharma, Microsoft Research goes to Bangalore, CNET NEWS, Jan. 12, 2005, 
http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-Research-goes-to-Bangalore/2100-1008_3-5533395.html. 
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meeting room in Dublin, and [a] sidewalk cafe in Istanbul.”122 When innovation occurs 
transnationally, as it now apparently does, it is hard to pin down the nation to which the 
fruits of innovators’ labors belong. Should source code written in the Lima office of a 
London-based company be considered a Peruvian or British export? 
¶40  At first blush, “rules of origin” offer a tempting solution to the above question 
because those rules are often used to investigate trade issues, such as “whether a shipment 
falls within a quota limitation, qualifies for a tariff preference or is affected by an anti-
dumping duty.”123 In the Wassenaar Arrangement context, however, rules of origin provide 
less guidance because the rules “vary from country to country.”124 Given the Wassenaar 
Arrangement’s focus on national discretion, each of the forty-one members is presumably 
responsible for classifying a given product for export control purposes pursuant to that 
country’s rules of origin. Using this approach to determine the origin of a product that 
originates from more than one country, however, “can be very complex, sometimes 
subjective, and time-consuming.”125 
¶41  The process becomes all the more complex, subjective, and time-consuming when 
the teams that produce an item are themselves multinational. Ever-improving technology 
allows companies like eBay, Microsoft, and Google to “pick the best brains from anywhere 
in a global organisation and set them working together in cyberspace.”126 Multinational 
teams add an additional layer of complexity to export issues because a product is 
sometimes considered to have been exported to a foreign country the moment that a foreign 
national is given access to it. This type of export, called a “deemed export,” is a “legal 
fiction” that is “based on the assumption that conveying information to a foreign national 
will result in the information being relayed to that national’s home country.”127 The deemed 
export rule can be activated in a variety of settings: 
[The settings] range from allowing a foreign national to inspect a product 
or technical data, to having a conversation with a foreign national. However, 
the [deemed export] rule applies not only to actual releases, but also to 
possible releases: if a foreign employee can access a controlled commodity, 
software, or technology, it could qualify as a deemed export regardless of 
whether the employee actually accessed the information.128 
Given the “intangible, amorphous nature of deemed transfers,” exporting countries with an 
operational deemed export rule face “special hazards and difficulties” due to the 
“increasing use of internal company e-mail servers, or intranets, where proprietary data is 
 
122 Inside Google workplaces, from perks to nap pods, CBS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2013, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-google-workplaces-from-perks-to-nap-pods/.  
123 WTO.COM, Glossary, Rules of Origin, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/rules_of_origin_e.htm. 
124 Id. 
125 VIVIAN C. JONES & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34524, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: RULES OF ORIGIN 1 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34524.pdf. 
126 Alicia Clegg, Tactics for remote teamwork, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77c904b6-51b1-11e1-a99d-00144feabdc0.html. 
127 Joseph A. Schoorl, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage and U.S. Dual-Use Export 
Controls, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 640-41 (2012). 
128 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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shared among employees, and broad company computer networks where a foreign national 
may gain access to controlled data and files.”129 Although the rule is not in place in all 
jurisdictions, it is a factor in certain large export markets such as the United States.130 
Describing the challenges U.S.-based technology companies face because of the deemed 
export rule, Professors Ron Smith and Bernard Udis write: 
It is now common for U.S. software engineers to work on a program during 
the day, beam it by satellite to India, Israel, or Russia, where another team 
works on it during the U.S. night and passes it back the next morning. 
Controlling such technology transfer raises obvious difficulties for 
traditional export control mechanisms.131 
¶42  As increasingly multinational teams in multiple offices of multinational firms 
collaborate on high-tech products like cyber technology, determining a country of origin 
for those products—or even figuring out the precise moment that those products have been 
exported if the deemed export rule applies—will become arbitrary if not altogether 
impossible. Suppose a source code is written by a team of Canadian, Kenyan, and Japanese 
nationals working together in the Lima office of a London-based company. If the Canadian 
writes the code, and then asks his Japanese colleague to review it, and the Japanese 
colleague subsequently shows the code to their Kenyan teammate, how many times has the 
code been exported and which country’s export rules apply? Is the answer different if the 
three of them jointly generate the code instead of passing it to one another for editing? A 
rule that assigns the finished source code to one or another of the five countries would 
require so much willful ignorance of the other four de facto origins as to be irredeemable. 
¶43  c. Mass Collaboration—Cross-border collaborations are not limited to the private 
sector; in more informal environments, people from all over the world use the Internet to 
collectively generate a variety of things, including software. Professor Yochai Benkler 
teaches that despite the enduring belief that rational individuals act out of narrowly-defined 
self-interests, the advent of open-source software in recent years has shown that thousands 
of volunteers collaborating on a “complex economic project” are capable of “beat[ing] the 
largest and best-financed business enterprises in the world at their own game.”132 Increased 
 
129 Corr, supra note 32, at 475. 
130 Collins, supra note 44, at 110 (“In addition to regulating the more traditional exportation of tangible 
goods, the EAR [Export Administration Regulations] encompasses the more abstract concept of intangible 
technology releases through the Deemed Export Rule (DER). Despite no formal recognition until 1996, 
releases of controlled technology to foreign nationals working inside U.S. borders are subject to DER 
export controls. The DER is not supported by legislative language, a fact recognized in the Congressional 
debates over reauthorization. The DER stands for the proposition that a legal, foreign worker in the U.S. 
exposed to controlled technology subject to the EAR has imported that technology to his or her home 
country solely by virtue of their exposure.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Corr, 
supra note 32, at 473 (“U.S. companies should be aware that controlled transactions may occur when they 
hire foreign nationals and allow them access to controlled technology. This type of transfer is termed a 
“deemed export” because the foreigner’s access to the controlled technology is deemed to be a restricted 
transfer to the foreigner’s country of citizenship.”). 
131 Smith & Udis, supra note 31, at 87. 
132 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369, 371 
(2002). See also MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 115, at 42 (“Open-source software projects are 
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connectivity, made possible by computer communications networks that have become 
“faster, cheaper, and more ubiquitous,” has brought about “a dramatic change in the scope, 
scale, and efficacy of peer production.”133 The era of mass collaboration, it seems, has 
arrived. 
¶44  It is difficult to grasp the concept of mass collaboration without an example. The 
McKinsey Global Institute offers Apache as a case study in which “open-source 
collaborators are distributed around the globe and rarely, if ever, work in person.”134 
According to McKinsey, a single Apache project in which “nearly 400 people provided 
code and identified close to 3,000 bugs” is evidence of “the immense sophistication and 
potential of online collaboration tools.”135 McKinsey also notes that Apache is “the most 
widely deployed web server.”136 Putting aside the laudable sophistication and significant 
potential value of these types of projects, the hundreds of geographically dispersed 
collaborators behind a piece of open-source software like Apache make meaningful 
country of origin identification—let alone export control—into an exercise in futility. 
¶45  Admittedly, the dual-use technologies targeted by the cyber amendment, such as 
intrusion software, do not include web servers like Apache. In principle, however, source 
code for an intrusion program can just as easily be created, shared, and jointly improved 
upon as source code for a program like Apache. Any attempt to control the export of an 
intrusion program—or any controlled cyber technology—would need to comprehensively 
address the fact that when a single item is the product of individuals located in hundreds 
of places, it is more the product of our borderless planet than the product of any given 
country. 
¶46  d. Cloud Computing—The complications generated by transnational collaborative 
teams are exponentially compounded by cloud computing, which is already considered 
“vital to the success of billions of individuals, businesses and entire economies.”137 The 
“cloud” consists of “a vast network of large computers called servers”138 that can be located 
“anywhere in the world with adequate electricity and Internet connectivity.”139 Purchasing 
cloud services does not entail purchasing a set of physical servers; rather, consumers 
purchase a “virtual machine” that “behaves like a physical computer but actually utilizes 
resources from numerous interconnected servers.”140 Crucially, information in the cloud 
“is automatically allocated to different servers based on a number of factors, and these 
allocations generally occur without the knowledge of providers or users.”141 The cloud 
“can be accessed through any Internet-enabled computer” and “it can also be hacked into 
from anywhere.”142  
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¶47  Perpetually and imperceptibly moving data in the cloud turns the entire current 
export control paradigm on its head. With electricity and Internet access spreading to every 
corner of the globe and with users and providers of cloud services mostly unaware of server 
locations or data movements, data in the cloud will eventually become functionally 
omnipresent. Imagine if the Canadian, Kenyan, and Japanese programmers in that Lima 
office of a London-based company store their source code in the cloud. If the source code 
is a multinational product that exists everywhere at once, what impact could the cyber 
amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement possibly have on that code’s ultimate 
destination?  
3. Cyber Technology’s Intangibility Makes Control Especially Challenging 
¶48  The cyber amendment added two types of software to the Wassenaar Arrangement 
control list.143 Since software is defined by the Arrangement as an expression of 
instructions that direct the actions of a computer,144 the cyber amendment put export 
controls over a specific type of information. The problems inherent in controlling 
information make the cyber amendment particularly unlikely to be effective. 
¶49  As a preliminary matter, cyber technology is based on data and is therefore 
completely unlike the scores of tangible dual-use products that the Wassenaar Arrangement 
controls. The latter can be physically inspected at a border. The former comprises 
knowledge and speech in the form of strings of numbers and letters; these intangible 
technologies can be transferred via intangible mediums of transfer such as telephone calls, 
emails, and face-to-face conversations between individuals holding disparate passports. 
Designed to manage tangible exports, conventional methods of export control can do little 
to prevent the spread of information from one person to another.  
¶50  In particular, the advent of modern technology has decimated the odds of information 
remaining confidential over time. Steven Levy, a journalist who focuses on privacy and 
technology, explains why: 
The telegraph, telephone, radio, and especially the computer have put 
everyone on the globe within earshot—at the price of our privacy. It may 
feel like we’re performing an intimate act when, sequestered in our rooms 
and cubicles, we casually use our cell phones and computers to transmit our 
thoughts, confidences, business plans, and even our money. But clever 
eavesdroppers, and sometimes even not-so-clever ones, can hear it all. We 
think we’re whispering, but we’re really broadcasting.145 
Levy may be referring to the difficulties modernity has created for those wishing to keep 
personal data private, but his insights are applicable to secrets of any nature, including 
source code. Put simply: efforts to hold back the dissemination of sought-after information 
inevitably founder. For instance, despite the millions of dollars that the Kremlin poured 
 
143 See supra Part IV (describing the two types of software that the cyber amendment added to the 
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into its efforts to silence foreign—especially Western—radio broadcasts in the Soviet 
Union,146 the masses invariably obtained access to news from beyond the Iron Curtain. In 
1967, Soviet Jews famously found ways to bypass government jamming and ended up 
“glued to their radios” as they listened to BBC and Voice of America broadcasts about 
Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War.147 Just as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics failed 
to stop information from penetrating its borders in the 1960s, so too the Islamic Republic 
of Iran failed to keep information from escaping its borders in the 2000s.  Following Iran’s 
disputed 2009 presidential election, Tehran’s army of cyber-censors could not hide facts, 
images, or even videos about the regime’s gruesome crackdown on protesters from the rest 
of the world.148 Not even the legendary Iranian Internet blockade149 could stand in the way 
of information speeding down the information superhighway. But data need not be 
controversial or momentous to be infectious; the numbers and letters behind software 
programs are as shareable as any news story. After all, packets of computer code are a form 
of knowledge and, as The Economist rightly posits, “[a]ttempting to stop people from 
generating and spreading knowledge is futile.”150 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶51  Flawed as it may be, the December 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement 
leaves room for measured optimism for at least three reasons.  
¶52  First, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s successes and failures must be understood in 
context. The Wassenaar Arrangement is merely an arrangement; it is not and has never 
been a binding treaty. The Arrangement’s non-binding characteristics put it closer to “soft 
law” than “hard law” on the spectrum of international legalization, and it was precisely this 
softness that facilitated the compromises that were required to bring the Arrangement into 
existence in the first place.151 
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¶53  Second, the multilateral dialogue that the Arrangement stimulates is no small fry. 
Cyber threats know no borders and, accordingly, any effort to defend against them within 
national boundaries simply makes no sense. Export control regimes like the Wassenaar 
Arrangement are “important promulgators of multilateral norms.”152 These norms are an 
invaluable tool for pressuring both members and non-members into complying with regime 
regulations. Indeed, nonproliferation experts praise multilateral export control regimes for 
“helping set international standards for limiting exports of sensitive items and helping stem 
proliferation in particular countries of concern.”153  
¶54  Finally, expectations about the Wassenaar Arrangement are so low—the former head 
of the Wassenaar Secretariat once declared that although the Arrangement has not yielded 
any “spectacular results,” the situation would be worse without it154—that there is little 
chance that the Arrangement has duped or will dupe anybody into a false sense of security.  
¶55  For these reasons, the striking mismatch between the cyber dangers we are facing 
and the limited potential of the December 2013 amendment to protect us should not be a 
cause for alarm.155 It should be a call to action. Notwithstanding the lessons of history, not 
all forms of cyber technology are doomed to go the way of encryption programs. Collective 
action by members of the international community created the Wassenaar Arrangement in 
the first place; with still more collective action, the Arrangement’s organizational 
shortcomings can be remedied. Even theoretical challenges, ever a thorn in the side of 
regulatory schemes, can be managed—to some extent at least—with sufficient creativity. 
Boundless determination, rather than hopeless fatalism, is the only option we have to 
protect ourselves. The cyber amendment was a step in the right direction. Having an 





weapons and dual-use technologies illustrates the use of soft legalization to facilitate 
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